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The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European 
Characteristics 
Sven Biscop 
On 28 June 2016 High Representative 
Federica Mogherini presented the Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s 
Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) to 
the European Council. Many pundits 
will present it as another example of 
Brussels’ otherworldliness to table an 
external strategy just a few days after the 
UK created a huge internal challenge by 
voting to leave the Union. But would it 
have demonstrated a better sense of 
reality to pretend that because of the 
British decision to put a stop to its EU 
membership the world around Europe 
will come to a stop as well? The EU 
needs the EUGS and that “is even more 
true after the British referendum”, as 
Mogherini rightly says in the foreword. 
Many will also gladly find fault with the 
document, looking for the deficiencies. 
But it is the strategy now. Therefore the 
question is not what it could have said 
that it doesn’t, but whether it gives us 
something to work with to render EU 
foreign and security policy more 
effective. The answer is: yes, and quite a 
lot. Having gotten that out of the way, 
we can move on to the substance of the 
EUGS. 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
First of all, the EUGS introduces a new overall 
approach to foreign and security policy, which 
can be read as a correction on the 2003 
European Security Strategy (ESS) that preceded it. 
“The best protection for our security is a 
world of well-governed democratic states”, we 
said in 2003. Unfortunately, spreading good 
governance and democracy proved more 
difficult than expected, and when their 
absence provoked crises, we did not always 
muster the will and the means to respond. 
Where the ESS proved to be overoptimistic 
(and optimism is a moral duty, as Karl Popper 
said), the EUGS is more conscious of the 
limits imposed by our own capabilities and by 
others’ intractability, and therefore more 
modest. It charts a course between 
isolationism and interventionism, between 
“dreamy idealism and unprincipled 
pragmatism”, as I put in a 2014 policy brief,1 
under the new heading of what the EUGS 
now calls “principled pragmatism”.  
 
This represents a return to Realpolitik. Not 
Realpolitik as it has come to be understood, 
the end justifying the means, but Realpolitik in 
the original sense of the term. As John Bew 
usefully reminds us, Realpolitik as coined by 
the German liberal Ludwig von Rochau in 
1853 meant a rejection of liberal utopianism, 
but not of liberal ideals themselves. Rather, “it 
held out a vision of the future and a guide for 
how to get there”, for how to achieve those 
ideals in a realistic way.2 Or, as the EUGS has 
it, “responsible engagement can bring about 
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positive change”. This, says Bew, is the “real 
Realpolitik”; given that other actors still pursue 
the Machiavellian version, let’s call it 
Realpolitik with European characteristics.  
 
The fact that for the first time ever an EU 
document lists our vital interests (which is a 
breakthrough in its own right) is a reflection of 
this new approach. Policy is about interests; if 
isn’t, no one will invest in it. That applies to 
the EU as much as to a state, and: “There is 
no clash between national and European 
interests”. The vital interests that the EUGS 
defines are vital to all Member States: the 
security of EU citizens and territory; 
prosperity (which, the EUGS states, implies 
equality – otherwise we would indeed not be 
talking about the prosperity of all citizens); 
democracy; and a rules-based global order to 
contain power politics. Setting these interests 
off against the analysis of the global 
environment that Mogherini presented to the 
European Council in June 2015,3 the EUGS 
identifies five priorities: (1) the security of the 
EU itself; (2) the neighbourhood; (3) how to 
deal with war and crisis; (4) stable regional 
orders across the globe; and (5) effective 
global governance.  
 
PRIORITIES FOR PRINCIPLED 
PRAGMATISM  
 
The way to pursue the first three priorities 
especially clearly reflects the modesty or 
realism imposed by “principled pragmatism”, 
by emphasizing our own security, the 
neighbourhood, and hard power, and by no 
longer emphasizing democratization.  
 
First, there is a strong focus on Europe’s own 
security (which was much less present in the 
ESS) and on the neighbourhood: “We will take 
responsibility foremost in Europe and its 
surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted 
engagement further afield”. Following the 
terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, and the 
refugee crisis that is visible across Europe, 
addressing our internal and border security 
was indispensable for the EUGS to be credible 
with citizens and Member States alike. The 
focus on the neighbourhood is justified by the 
 range of our capabilities. It is defined very 
broadly though, going beyond what Brussels 
now often calls the “neighbours of the 
neighbours”: “to the east stretching into 
Central Asia, and south down to Central 
Africa”. Stabilizing this part of the world is no 
mean task, yet the EUGS achieves the right 
balance for it does not ignore the challenges in 
Asia (“There is a direct connection between 
European prosperity and Asian security”) and 
at the global level (such as the freedom of the 
global commons).  
 
Second, there is much less emphasis on 
democracy. In line with the November 2015 
Joint Communication on the future of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
(though the EUGS looks at a broader region),4 
democratization no longer is a compulsory part 
of the package. The EU will support 
democracies where they emerge, for “their 
success […] would reverberate across their 
respective regions” – but in our broad 
neighbourhood it only mentions Tunisia and 
Georgia as positive examples. As many others 
don’t wish closer relations with the EU, the 
EUGS puts the emphasis on reducing the 
fragility of these states rather than on changing 
their regimes, for which we have but limited 
leverage. But since many of our neighbours are 
“repressive states [that] are inherently fragile in 
the long term”, that requires targeting civil 
society instead. The aim is to increase the 
resilience of people and societies, notably by 
fighting poverty and inequality, so that over 
time home-grown positive change can emerge. 
Just like in the Joint Communication, it is not 
entirely clear where the funds for this will 
come from.  
 
Lowering the level of ambition in terms of 
democratization is but the acceptance of 
reality. This is all about being honest with 
ourselves. The EU cannot democratize Egypt, 
so it should not pretend to. At the same time, 
it should then also not feel obliged to pretend 
that the Al-Sisi regime is a great friend – it is 
not. But we maintain diplomatic relations with 
(nearly) everybody, not just with our friends, 
and we work with (nearly) everybody where 
interests coincide. As long as they are there, we 
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can indeed be obliged to work with 
authoritarian regimes in order to address 
urgent problems; the anti-IS coalition is a case 
in point. The EUGS doesn’t say much about 
this dimension: how to work with regimes, in 
line with “principled pragmatism”, without 
further strengthening their hold on power?  
 
This question demonstrates that resilience is a 
tricky concept to be used in this context. 
Increasing the resilience of a state against 
external threats can easily lead to increasing the 
resilience of a repressive regime. While we 
have to be modest about our ability to change 
regimes, we should not be propping them up 
either. It makes sense therefore for the EUGS 
to simultaneously advocate capacity-building 
and the reform of the justice, security and 
defence sectors, as well as human rights 
protection. The strong emphasis on human 
rights (which is indeed to be distinguished 
from democratization) is indispensable, for it is 
often against their own governments that 
people have to be resilient. But can we deliver 
on that promise? Perhaps fighting inequalities 
would have been a better heading for the new 
strategy towards our eastern and southern 
neighbours than resilience (the meaning of 
which is not really clarified by the introduction 
of “energy and environmental resilience”).  
 
By the way, if the EU wants to be more honest 
with itself, then (the Balkans excepted) “a 
credible enlargement policy” does not really 
have a place in the section on the 
neighbourhood, for enlargement no longer is a 
credible project, least of all for Turkey.  
 
Third, there is a much stronger awareness of 
the indispensability of a credible military 
instrument. “Soft and hard power go hand in 
hand”, Mogherini rightly says in the foreword. 
The EUGS has not rediscovered geopolitics 
per se – the ESS already stated that “even in an 
era of globalisation, geography is still 
important” – but more than the ESS it 
recognizes that some powers don’t hesitate to 
use blackmail and force in what they consider 
to be a geopolitical competition. Hence the 
ambition “to protect Europe, respond to 
external crises, and assist in developing our 
partners’ security and defence capacities”. 
Furthermore, our efforts “should enable the 
EU to act autonomously while also 
contributing to and undertaking actions in 
cooperation with NATO”. This can be read as 
the EU constituting the European pillar that 
allows its Member States to act with the US 
where possible and without US assets when 
necessary (which could actually also be through 
NATO, the UN or an ad hoc coalition as well 
as the EU itself).   
 
The ends to which the EU should apply this 
“strategic autonomy” (as Mogherini calls in in 
the foreword) are spread throughout the text. 
First, “this means living up to our 
commitments to mutual assistance and 
solidarity”, i.e. Articles 42.7 TEU and 222 
TFEU. Second, where conflict is ongoing, the 
EU should “protect human lives, notably 
civilians” and “be ready to support and help 
consolidate local ceasefires”, presumably in the 
broad neighbourhood as a matter of priority. 
This is an ambitious undertaking, for it entails 
deploying troops on the ground, with serious 
firepower, who are backed up by serious air 
support and ready reserves, and who don’t 
necessarily seek out and destroy an opponent 
but who will fight when the civilians for whom 
they are responsible are threatened. Third, the 
EU “is seeking to make greater practical 
contributions to Asian security”, including in 
the maritime area. Finally, the EU “could assist 
further and complement UN peacekeeping” as 
a demonstration of its belief in the UN as “the 
bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order”.  
 
These are more than sufficient elements to 
translate the EUGS into a revised military level 
of ambition in “a sectoral strategy, to be agreed 
by the Council” – into a white paper, in other 
words, that should kick-start more cooperation 
and even integration in defence. The EUGS 
also offers guidelines on how to do that: “an 
annual coordinated review process at EU level 
to discuss Member States’ military spending 
plans”. Or, as an earlier draft had it, a 






AN AMBITIOUS DIPLOMATIC 
PROGRAMME  
 
Of the remaining two priorities, the focus on 
“cooperative regional orders” also reflects the 
awareness of ongoing geopolitical competition 
between different global and regional powers. 
The intention to ensure a coherent response to 
China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative not just 
through the EU-China Connectivity Platform 
(to create the link with the EU’s own investment 
plans) but through ASEM and the EU-ASEAN 
partnership as well could signal the start of a 
sophisticated diplomatic initiative. In the same 
vein, the aim to deepen dialogue with Iran and 
the GCC countries ought to be the beginning of 
a new vision on the future regional order in the 
Middle East, though the EUGS itself could have 
offered more guidance already. After all, there is 
not one but several wars ongoing in an area that 
clearly falls within the neighbourhood in which 
the EU ought to assume responsibility. This will 
also be one of the issues (though it is not among 
the examples explicitly listed in the EUGS) on 
which the EU will have to cooperate with 
Russia, while making “substantial changes in 
relations” dependent on Russia’s respect for 
international law. On Russia, the EUGS basically 
advocates strategic patience.  
 
The fifth priority puts global governance firmly 
back on the EU agenda, after “effective 
multilateralism” (as the ESS phrased it) had 
more or less disappeared from the radar screen. 
Now the EUGS ambitiously sets out “to 
transform rather than simply preserve the 
existing system”, which will indeed be necessary 
to prevent “the emerging of alternative 
groupings to the detriment of all”. Under this 
heading as well, an ambitious programme on 
free trade (envisaging FTAs with the US, Japan, 
Mercosur, India, ASEAN and others) and on the 
freedom of the global commons could herald a 
creative diplomatic initiative – and a more 
strategic use of EU trade policy, which ought to 
be as embedded in overall strategy as it is in the 
US.  
 
Of course, the EUGS does also show some 
deficiencies. Most eye-catching is the curious 
lack of diplomatic ambition when it comes to 
dealing with conflicts and crises, the third 
priority. In contrast with the ambitious 
(though perhaps not fully realized) military 
implications of the goal to protect civilians, the 
EUGS appears rather reactive on the 
diplomatic front. When peace agreements are 
reached, the EU will support them and provide 
security, but when they are not, the EUGS 
seems to prioritize the local level. To take the 
case of Syria: brokering local ceasefires will 
save people (if they are guaranteed militarily), 
but ultimately only diplomatic success in 
Geneva will end the war. The EU actually is 
good at diplomacy, and the EUGS refers at 
several instances to the successful example of 
the Iran nuclear negotiations, so it could have 
been more ambitious in this area.  
 
CONCLUSION: TO WORK  
 
The EUGS is a strategy, and strategies have to 
be translated into sub-strategies, policies and 
action to achieve their objectives. Unlike in 
2003, the EUGS itself already provides the 
linkage to what should become a systematic 
process of implementation and review. First, it 
calls for a prompt decision on “clear 
procedures and timeframes” for the revision of 
existing and design of new sectoral strategies. 
Second, it announces an annual reflection on 
the state of play, “pointing out where further 
implementation must be sought”, though not a 
systematic overall review. “A new process of 
strategic reflection will be launched whenever 
the EU and its Member States deem it 
necessary”, so not automatically every five 
years, for every legislature.  
 
For this scheme to succeed, it is crucial that it 
be firmly anchored institutionally, not just 
within the EEAS but in the Commission as 
well. Of course, the High Representative has 
the main ownership of the EUGS and will 
assure overall coordination and initiative. But 
which body, including Commission and EEAS 
officials, will monitor implementation and 
prepare the annual state of play? (Analogous to 
the National Security Council in the US, which 
not only coordinates the drafting of the 
National Security Strategy but also monitors 
whether all relevant subsequent documents 
 




comply with its approach). And, most crucially, 
will the Member States feel ownership of the 
EUGS? Mogherini will obviously drive 
implementation, but if it is only her, it cannot 
work. And implementing this ambitious Strategy 
will demand a serious drive.   
 
This is where the Brexit will have the most 
impact on the EUGS. Not on substance: the 
analysis of the environment, the definition of 
our vital interests, and the identification of our 
priorities do not change because we will be one 
Member State fewer. But, unfortunately, it will 
have a negative impact on the capacity for 
delivery. For one, the EU has quite simply lost 
face – and face is important in diplomacy. The 
credibility and persuasiveness of any EU 
initiative will be undermined by the fact that one 
of the three biggest Member States has just 
decided to leave. And, unlike the High 
Representative in her preface, I am less 
confident that “we are the best in this field” of 
soft power. Furthermore, the UK can no longer 
directly contribute its impressive diplomatic and 
military clout to EU foreign and security policy. 
What options there are to bring it to bear 
indirectly will have to be explored.  
 
Nevertheless, Federica Mogherini is absolutely 
right when she says: “A fragile world calls for a 
more confident and responsible European 
Union”. Even though the EU itself is somewhat 
more fragile now than in 2003. Hiding inside for 
fear of the world around us will not solve 
anything however, whereas “responsible 
engagement can bring about positive change”. 
Hence: to work.  
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